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ABSTRACT
In a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite system, LEO satellites can collect data and
relay the data to ground stations. Today, many countries and regions within the world (e.g.,
the European Union (EU), provinces or states within a country, or a country itself) have
strict data sovereignty policies that do not allow sensitive data to be transmitted outside of
national, regional, state, or provincial borders. Thus, if a LEO satellite is to collect ground
terminal data from a sensor device (such as operational data of non-urban emergency
vehicles), it must do so within bounds of the data residency and sovereignty polices based
on the location of the customer. In other words, for the LEO satellite to be compliant, it
cannot relay data to just any ground station - it must do to one that meets the requirements
of the sovereignty policy. Presented herein is a technique to enforce data sovereignty
policies when data is collected by LEO satellites in order to ensure that, when the data is
passed back to ground stations, data sovereignty policies are enforced.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
As LEO satellites pass overhead for an LEO satellite system, the satellites collect
data from sensors. Once data is collected by an LEO satellite, the data needs to be relayed
down to a ground station. Such data transmission may happen in one of several ways:
1. A large constellation of LEO satellites may relay the data through other LEO
satellites in the constellation until the data reaches an LEO satellite that is currently
passing over a ground station (typically through lasers) - this method is generally
low latency;
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2. A small constellation of LEO satellites may include only a handful of satellites. In
a small constellation system, the LEO satellites will cache data until the satellites
pass over a ground station during their orbit. Such satellites will typically pass over
a ground station several times a day. This model is popular with many Internet of
Things (IoT) satellite startups; or
3. An LEO satellite relays data to a higher-orbit satellite, such as a Medium Earth
Orbit (MEO) or a Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite. The higher-orbit
station will then relay the traffic to a ground station. This model is generally more
expensive than other LEO satellite systems.
In all cases, ground stations may be positioned in various parts of the globe, and the ground
stations may or may not be located in the same country as the ground terminals.
Today, many countries and regions within the world (e.g., the EU, provinces or
states within a country, or a country itself) have strict data sovereignty policies that do not
allow sensitive data to be transmitted outside of national, regional, state, or provincial
borders. Thus, if an LEO satellite is to collect ground terminal data from a sensor device
(such as operational data of non-urban emergency vehicles), it must do so within bounds
of the data residency and sovereignty polices of the customer. In other words, for an LEO
satellite to be compliant with data sovereignty policies, it cannot relay data to just any
ground station, but rather must relay data to a ground station that meets the requirements
of a given sovereignty policy of a customer.
Thus, there is a need to align data sovereignty policies of a customer with data
transmissions from LEO satellite systems back to ground stations to ensure compliance of
such systems.
This proposal provides a technique to enforce data sovereignty policies when data
is collected by LEO satellites in order to ensure that, when the data is passed back to ground
stations, data sovereignty policies are enforced.
Consider, for example, that a constellation of LEO satellites is deployed, along with
a series of ground stations placed around the globe. The LEO satellites can collect data
from ground terminal devices as they fly over (e.g., sensors such as vehicles, agriculture
sensors, forest fire detection sensors, Department of Homeland Security sensors, etc.). The
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LEO satellites must then relay the data to ground stations when they come into range of
the ground stations.
In accordance with this proposal, the LEO constellation operator can implement a
data sovereignty/data residency (DR/DS) policy mechanism through a front-end tool that
allows each customer to define their data sovereignty policy. The policy for each device
can be stored in a DR/DS database that can reference every authorized device that can
transmit data to the LEO constellation, along with a list of compliant ground stations that
may receive the relayed data. The DR/DS database may be locally cached on the satellite,
or it may be provided via a ground server.
For example, a customer may define a policy for any scenario, such as:


Data transmitted from any the Department of Homeland Security ground
terminals may only be relayed to ground stations physically within the
United States;



Data transmitted by a European defense sensor device may only be
downloaded to a ground station within a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) country; or



Data transmitted from a healthcare wearable sensor may only relay patient
data to a Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA)
compliant ground station.

For small constellations of LEO satellites that are not able to relay data to other
satellites and must cache the data, each time the LEO satellite comes within range of a
ground station it will synchronize its local DR/DS database with a master DR/DS database
on the ground, allowing it to update new devices, along with their policy.
In essence, DR/DS policy definitions can be used to enforce a system through
which LEO satellite can identify DR/DS policies for corresponding devices in order to
relay data/traffic to a ground station that meets the corresponding DR/DS policies. Thus,
the novelty of this proposal can be realized by defining which ground stations are
acceptable for downlink transmission of data, in accordance with one or more DR/DS
policies.
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When an LEO satellite comes within range of a sensor (or group of sensors), data
is transmitted from the sensor(s) to the satellite. This data is stored queued on the satellite
until it can be transmitted to a ground station. For each customer, the data is stored in a
compartmentalized format, preventing data sharing or leakage from one customer to
another.
When the LEO satellite passes overhead and makes a connection with the ground
station, it first verifies the identity of the device. The satellite then accesses the DR/DS
policy database, and a satellite router can then append a series of bits to the header of an to
IP packet (e.g., metadata, IPv6 extension headers, etc.), with a set of known identifiers of
ground stations that may be used for this data (which are compliant to the policy).
Thereafter, the LEO satellite can either relay the data along a sky path until it
reaches a satellite that is overhead a compliant ground station, or it can continue to cache
the data until it passes over a compliant ground station later at a later time. When the
satellite is over a compliant station, the data can be relayed to the ground. As the ground
station receives the transmission, the same validation can be performed. Data that is not
compliant is rejected and the station can signal to the satellite the rejection along with a
reason for the rejection.
Figure 1, below, provides an example illustration of various operations that may be
performed in accordance with the technique of this proposal.

Figure 1: Example Operational Illustration
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In some instances, a DR/DS policy may also include details that can be expanded
to include not just the type of customer, but also the type and/or sensitivity of data. For
example, if any data includes Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and is sensitive
(e.g., health data transmitted from wearables, etc.), the data may be marked with a data
sensitivity identifier. When the data collector on the LEO satellite sees this PII marker, the
data collector can retain the PII marker in the packet beyond the ground station. For
example, some sensors in a health system may not include PII data, but other data from
this same health care provider will include such PII data (e.g., from wearables, etc.). In this
case, only the sensitive data would be augmented with the PII indicator, providing further
details to the data relay on the LEO satellite that this data may only be downlinked to
specific ground stations that meet data privacy and control standards (such as HIPPA
compliance).
Further, the technique proposed herein can also be extended to techniques that may
involve identifying the origin device, including identification of the device during an
onboarding phase, and linking to a mapping function in the satellite that links the device
identity with a policy generated by an end customer. Additionally, the technique may
further be extended to identify an application being used by a device that has a data
sovereignty policy that has been generated by a customer. Further, the technique may be
extended to marking data or a packet generated by a policy-sensitive application or device
that can be recognized by other satellites in a constellation, as well as by a ground station.
Moreover, the technique can be enhanced to enable enforcement by a ground station that
may refuse a download of non-compliant data from an LEO satellite and/or, conversely,
by an LEO satellite may refuse to downlink data to a non-compliant ground station in
which, in some instances, the LEO satellite can search for a compliant ground station.
In summary, this proposal provides various techniques through which data
sovereignty policies can be enforced for LEO satellite communications such that, when
data is transmitted from an LEO satellite to a given ground station, data sovereignty
policies can be enforced.
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